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Abstract. Countries often use economic sanctions to coerce other countries to change 
certain policies of which they do not approve. However, if sanctioned countries 
smuggle goods over the border, use informal financial intermediaries, and develop 
black markets to trade sanctioned goods, sanctions end up having a smaller impact, 
sanctioned countries have little incentive to modify their policies, and sanctions are 
more likely to fail. This paper is the first study to test empirically whether sanctions 
affect informality. I compile data from different studies about the size of the informal 
market for 147 countries over 46 years. I use these data to analyze the relationship 
between the size of the informal market adjusted by the size of the population and 
economic sanctions. I also estimate at the impact of economic sanctions on other 
activities associated with informal activities. I find that informal markets increase 
when a country is being sanctioned and the effects are larger when the economic 
sanction has strong international support. I also find that the type of sanction, trade 
or financial, is not an important determinant of the informal market size and that 
sanctions also lead to increases in robbery rates and corruption. 
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Introduction 
 
Anecdotal evidence shows that informal markets flourish in sanctioned 
countries. An Economist article describes the thriving black market trade 
between the sanctioned North Korea and China (The Economist, 2013). The 
New York Times describes how Iraq helped Iran skirt sanctions by 
facilitating illegal transfers through hawala houses (unofficial global 
networks of money traders), laundering money, and smuggling of oil (Risen 
and Adnan, 2012). In addition, according to a Washington Post article, 
economic sanctions led to the emergence of black markets for milk, foreign 
movies, and satellite dishes in Cuba (Roig-Franzia, 2006). 
 
Why do we observe such an increase in informal markets? When 
sanctioning countries (senders) cut trade, aid or financial transactions to 
sanctioned countries (targets), sometimes sanctioned goods are being 
smuggled over the border, sanctioned goods are being illegally produced in 
the target, and the number of underground financial transactions increases. 
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Also, sanctions lead to an increase in crimes associated with the informal 
activities, such as robberies. In addition, running an informal business and 
smuggling goods over the border could encourage corruption because more 
officials are bribed to close their eyes to those activities. 
 
Despite this anecdotal evidence, there are no empirical or theoretical 
papers describing the link between informal markets and economic 
sanctions. This paper fills this gap by estimating empirically the impact of 
various types of sanctions on the informal market size, crime rates, and 
corruption. This study finds that economic sanctions increase informality 
and other activities that are related to black or gray markets. This impact of 
economic sanctions is larger when sanctions have significant international 
support. 
 
This paper adds to the literature on the economic impact of sanctions and 
on the literature on the determinants of informal markets. The economic 
impact of sanctions literature is concentrated mostly on the effects of 
sanctions on trade. Evenett (2002) shows that United States' 
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act reduced bilateral imports from South 
Africa by a third. In addition, Hufbauer et al. (1997) study the impact of 
economic sanctions on bilateral trade flows and find that extensive 
sanctions have a large impact on bilateral trade flows. Unlike all these 
previous studies, my paper focuses on economic outcomes other than trade 
and tries to explain how sanctions affect the formal and informal 
economies. 
 
Many studies find the multilateral sanctions have stronger economic effects 
than unilateral sanctions. Yang et al. (2009) find that multilateral sanctions 
that involve both the US and the EU have a negative impact on EU trade 
(imports, exports, and total trade), but US unilateral sanctions have a 
negative and significant effect only on the total EU trade. Caruso (2003) 
estimates the impact of economic sanctions on trade using a gravity model 
and shows that sanctions have a large negative impact on bilateral trade 
when they are extensive and comprehensive1, but not when they are limited 
and moderate. Similar to these studies, in my paper, sanctions with 
international cooperation have a more pronounced effect on the informal 
economy than the ones without international cooperation. 
 
This paper also adds to the literature on the determinants of informal 
markets. Ingram et al. (2007) find that the incidence of formality is 
negatively correlated with the rate of taxation. In addition, a United Nations 
                                                             
1 Sanctions involving financial and trade sanctions (cuts in aid, financial relations, imports 
and exports). 
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study (United Nations. ECLAC and Department for International 
Development, 2003) finds that high taxes contributed to informal activity 
and encouraged firms to hire workers informally. Many businesses are not 
able to survive if they operate strictly according to the law when the state 
imposes high taxes, and ultimately, they are led to operating informally. 
However, according to Capasso and Jappelli (2013), high levels of taxation 
explain little of the informal activity. In my paper, I also control in the 
regression analysis for three tax rates: the highest personal income tax rate, 
the highest corporate income tax rate, and various tariff rates.  
 
Capasso and Jappelli (2013) show that institutional failures such as poor 
contract enforcement and judicial inefficiency reduce the incentive for firms 
and individuals to reveal their revenues. Dabla-Norris, Gradstein and 
Inchauste (2008) claim that the quality of the legal framework is crucially 
important in determining the size of the informal sector, whereas the 
significance of taxes, regulations, and financial constraints is reduced in the 
context of a well-functioning legal system. Legal quality is the primary 
determinant of informality. They also find that legal obstacles induce 
informality among larger firms. Ulyssea (2010) finds that increasing 
enforcement levels of institutions is an effective policy to reduce 
informality. In my paper, I also control for some institutions such as law and 
order, a variable measuring the strength and impartiality of the legal system 
and the popular observance of the law. 
 
Regulations affect informality because burdensome regulations condemn 
entrepreneurs to stay in the informal sector, according to Loayza, Oviedo 
and Serven (2005). Fialova and Schneider (2011) also mention regulatory 
distortions as an important determinant of the size of the informal market. 
Heavy regulations represent both direct costs for businesses, such as fees 
for the regulatory agencies or bribes to avoid the fees, and indirect costs, 
such as lost time figuring out complicated regulations. These costs lead to 
lower economic growth and higher informal sectors. Leibfritz (2011) shows 
that heavy regulations on businesses, such as administrative burdens on 
start-ups firms and restrictive labor laws, reduce the number of jobs in the 
formal economy and encourage firms to hire on the black market. Loayza, 
Oviedo and Serven (2005) also explain how excessive regulatory burden 
reduces growth and increases informality. My study also controls for a 
measure of regulations from the "Economic Freedom of the World" report 
(Frasier Institute 2012), but it does not find that it has a significant effect on 
the size of the shadow economy.  
 
Henley, Arabscheibani and Carneiro (2008) conclude that urban residents 
are less likely to operate in the informal market than those in rural areas. In 
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my paper, I also control for the share of urban population in case countries 
with large urban populations will have lower levels of informality. 
 
According to Oviedo (2009), informality is also correlated with income and 
development. Hazans (2011a, b) show that the level of GDP per capita has a 
positive effect on the prevalence of informal employment in Eastern and 
Southern Europe and an opposite effect in Western and Northern Europe. In 
my paper, economic sanctions affect the informal economy also through the 
formal economy. 
 
Enste (2003) finds that quality of governance and public services increases 
the benefits of contributing to the public system and working in the formal 
sector and thus, gives extra incentives to work in the formal sector. Fialova 
and Schneider (2011) discuss other factors of informality such as the 
incompetence of the state, the distrust of the population in the public 
institutions, and overall acceptance of informal work. In addition, Capasso 
and Jappelli (2013) find that low levels of tax morale and institutional 
distrust increase the size of the informal economy. In my study, I investigate 
how economic sanctions affect the ability of the sanctioned state to provide 
goods and services to its citizens, alter the level of trust people have in their 
state and how sanctions influence the informal economy through these 
channels. In addition, when I include government expenditures as a share of 
GDP in the regression analysis, the effects of sanctions on the size of the 
shadow economy are smaller. This result confirms that the ability of the 
government to provide goods and services to the taxpayers affects the size 
of the informal economy.  
 
Bosch (2006) shows that in states where the opportunity cost of employing 
people informally is small, there is a fall in formal employment and an 
increase in unemployment. In another paper, Bosch, Goni and Maloney 
(2007) find that a reduction in job finding rates in the formal market leads 
to an increase in the informal market. In my study, economic sanctions 
affect informal labor through the formal labor markets, by raising the 
unemployment rate and reducing the participation rate. 
 
Johnson et al. (2000) explain how corruption, measured through firms' 
reporting of extralegal payments for services or government licenses, is 
correlated with the percentage of sales unreported for tax purposes. 
Ingram, Ramachandran and Desai (2007) find that the incidence of 
formality is negatively correlated with corruption. Fialova and Schneider 
(2011) say that corruption and overall acceptance of black and gray work 
affect the level of informal markets in the Eastern Europe region. In my 
paper, I also look at the effects of sanctions on corruption to test whether 
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more bribes are being paid to cover and facilitate the informal activity in 
sanctioned states.  
 
The study is organized as follows: the next chapter presents the channels 
through which sanctions influence the level of informality in a target 
country, the next one describes the datasets, the method I used to calculate 
the shadow economy, and the econometric model. The following chapter 
shows the estimates for the effects of economic sanctions on the shadow 
economy and on other measures of informal activity, and the final chapter 
draws the main conclusions. 
 
 
Economic sanctions and informality 
 
Sanctions affect the informal economy directly and indirectly, through the 
formal economy and through other channels. Informal activities that are 
affected by economic sanctions can be divided into two broad categories: 
criminal such as smuggling, drug counterfeiting, etc. and noncriminal such 
as not reporting wages, underreporting self-employment income, or 
informal production of legal goods. 
 
Financial sanctions involve cuts in development aid, freezes of assets, or 
denying access to banks. These types of sanctions can reduce the number of 
official financial transactions which, in turn, can lead to an increase in 
underground financial transactions and to higher informal market activity. 
Reduced access to assets and even cuts in aid could reduce the ability of 
some firms to produce in the formal sector. If it more difficult to function in 
the formal market than in the informal market, then more companies will 
move into the informal market and the informal economy will increase. 
 
Aid is known to reduce the efficiency of certain sectors such as 
manufacturing and to reduce the profitability of investment (Rajan & 
Subramanian 2007), thus it is possible that economic sanctions involving 
cuts in development aid could increase firms’ productivity in the formal 
sector. These companies will be less likely to function in the informal 
market.  
 
Previous literature is split on whether development aid increases or not the 
quality of the institutions. If we believe Casey, Glennerster and Miguel 
(2012), then development aid increases the quality of institutions. Under 
this assumption, when sanctions are imposed, institutions weaken, 
companies and individuals operate easier in the informal market and 
shadow activity flourishes. If aid affects negatively the quality of institutions 
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(Selaya & Thiele 2010; Rajan & Subramanian 2007; Bjornskov 2010; and 
Djankov, Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2008), then the effects of sanctions on 
informality are negative. 
 
Aid also increases the investment in human capital (Celasun & Walliser, 
2008), so if sanctions involve cuts in aid, they will reduce the investment in 
human capital. In this way, people are not productive enough for the formal 
sector and are more likely to work in the informal labor markets, thus 
leading to an increase in the informality (Ovideo, 2009). 
 
Sanctions can involve cuts in trade between targets and senders. Such 
sanctions can increase informality by encouraging the smuggling of 
sanctioned goods. 
 
Trade is known to decrease unemployment and to increase official 
employment, labor force participation and wages in certain sectors 
(Helpman & Itskhoki, 2010; Hasan et al., 2012; Dutt, Mitra & Ranjan, 2009; 
Helpman, Itskhoki & Redding, 2010). A cut in trade due to sanctions could 
lead to fewer people working in the formal sector, smaller labor force 
participation in the formal markets, more labor participation in the informal 
markets and thus, more informality. However, some studies claim that trade 
could lead to higher unemployment and lower official employment in some 
sectors (Helpman & Itskhoki, 2010; Hasan et al., 2012; Attanasio, Goldberg 
and Pavcnik, 2004; Menezes, Aquino & Muendler, 2007), and if this is the 
case, the effects of sanctions on informality will be negative. 
 
If firms in the target cannot produce goods for export, then formal workers 
will be fired and will be forced to use their skills in the informal sector. In 
addition, the former trading firms will likely use their capital and labor in 
related informal sectors, when they cannot operate any more in the formal 
sector due to the cut in exports. In both cases, informality increases as a 
result of sanctions. 
 
A cut in imports could affect formal firms if the sanctioned goods are inputs, 
substitutes or complements for the goods these firms are producing. If the 
sanctioned goods are inputs or complements, then the firm faces higher 
costs of production and might hire more informal workers to reduce the 
labor costs or move into the informal sector if the costs are too high or it is 
impossible to produce without the sanctioned input. If the sanctioned good 
is a substitute, then the firm benefits from the sanction and it is less likely to 
operate in the informal sector. Similarly, cuts in imported goods could affect 
the informal markets directly and not only through the formal markets. The 
sanctioned goods could be substitutes, complements or inputs for the goods 
already produced in the informal markets at the time the sanctions are 
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imposed. Thus, these old informal markets could be affected positively or 
negatively by trade sanctions depending on the type of sanctioned good. 
 
Sanctions could lead to a deterioration of social services (Government 
Accountability Office, 2002). As people can no longer rely on welfare 
programs and unemployment insurance, the benefits to activate in the 
formal sector decline and people are more likely to activate in the informal 
markets. Similarly, if countries relied on aid excessively and not on their 
own revenues, then after sanctions are imposed, countries might not be 
prepared to collect taxes and properly administer the revenues. People 
might become disillusioned with the authorities' use of tax money, the tax 
morale will decrease and more taxpayers will join the informal economy 
(Torgler & Schneider, 2007). These conditions could lead to general distrust 
and dissatisfaction in the government and general acceptance of informality 
that leads to an increase in the shadow economy (Enste, 2003; Hazans, 
2011a). According to three studies, Capasso and Jappelli (2013), Hazans 
(2011b) and Loayza et al. (2005), sanctions increase the inefficiency of 
public institutions and lower quality of public goods provided to the citizens 
by the state. These two are well-known determinants of the opportunity 
costs of functioning in the shadow economy and thus, of the size of the 
shadow market.  
 
If sanctions involve cuts in technology aid or technology trade, they could 
also increase informality, as low access to technology is known to keep 
many firms informal and forces them to hire in the informal labor markets 
(United Nations. ECLAC and Department for International Development, 
2003). 
 
Sanctions are also known to reduce press freedom because the target 
governments attempt to restrict the country's interactions with the outside 
world (Peksen, 2010). If the press is not free, it is less likely to shed light on 
large informal operations and thus, it is easier for individuals and firms to 
produce underground. Also, a press that is not free can make the 
government less transparent and less accountable to its citizens, which can 
translate into more distrust in the public institutions and more willingness 
to operate underground, break the national laws, and evade taxes. 
 
However, not all economic sanctions can have large effects on the shadow 
economy. Sanctions that impose large costs on the formal markets are more 
likely to increase the size of the informal market.  
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Datasets and econometric methodology 
 
This paper uses shadow economy data, data that measure the size of the 
overall informal market, economic sanctions data, and other 
macroeconomic data. The shadow economy dataset is compiled from 
various studies using similar methods of estimating the size of the shadow 
economy in a particular country2. The sanctions data come from a seminal 
book, Hufbauer et al. (2007) and it is completed with data points taken from 
the Peterson Institute website3. These data cover economic sanctions 
imposed between the years 1914 to 2012 on targets from all around the 
globe. Finally, the macroeconomic data is compiled from Freedom of the 
World (Frasier Institute, 2012), Global Competitiveness Report (World 
Economic Forum, 2011), International Country Risk Guide (PRS Group 
2013), Petrescu (2012), United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2012) 
and the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2013). Table 1 shows 
the summary statistics.  
 
Table 1. Summary statistics 
                                                             
2 1. Arvate et al. (2005) 2. Bajada and Schneider (2003) 3. Chattopadhyay, Chaudhuri and 
Schneider (2005) 4. Dell'anno and Schneider (2003) 5. Mummert and Schneider (2002) 6. 
Schneider (2000), Schneider (2002a) 7. Schneider (2002b) 8. Schneider (2003) 9. Schneider 
(2004) 10. Schneider (2005) 11. Schneider and Enste (2000) 12. Schneider and Savasan 
(2005). 
3 http://www.piie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=1821. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
shadow  1291 11.08 1.43 7.41 13.73 
shadow1  1952 11.10 1.37 7.41 13.73 
robbery 676 116.06 262.53 0.1 2859.7 
kidnapping 569 1.99 3.39 0 21.2 
drugs  413 143.85 210.76 0.1 1493.1 
burglary  568 388.72 405.99 0 1939.2 
sexual  438 29.74 35.72 0 205.6 
corruption tax  383 3.60 1.62 1 7.6 
corruption 
contract 
383 4.82 1.72 1.3 8.35 
corruption trade 383 3.88 1.64 1.15 7.9 
sanction  12052 0.17 0.38 0 1 
cooperation  2099 2.30 .95 1 4 
gnp ratio  2099 1130.10 4757.89 .04 50869 
financial  11979 0.14 0.34 0 1 
comprehensive  11979 0.04 0.21 0 1 
high cooperation  11819 0.05 0.21 0 1 
high gnp ratio  11983 0.13 0.33 0 1 
urban  10680 48.79 25.28 2 100 
corporate   3694 30.99 13.08 0 75 
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Shadow economy dataset 
 
The shadow economy indicators created using the DYMIMIC approach are 
based on a statistical theory of unobserved variables and not on a specific 
theoretical model relating to shadow markets. Shadow economy tries to 
calculate "those economic activities and the income derived from them that 
circumvent [...] government regulation, taxation or observation" (Dell'Anno 
& Schneider, 2003). It estimates a wide range of unofficial activities, both 
monetary and nonmonetary transactions, legal and illegal activities 
(Dell'Anno & Schneider, 2003). Examples include smuggling, bartering with 
drugs and other illegal goods, unreported income, and barter of legal goods 
and services. 
 
The shadow economy dataset is compiled from various studies that use 
different variations of the DYMIMIC method4. Figure 1 shows the average 
size of shadow economy per GDP for six regions of the world over the 
period of time covered in the sample.  
 
                                                             
4 Schneider and Savasan (2005) use survey results from Turkey to estimate the size of the 
shadow economy. Arvate et al. (2005), Bajada and Schneider (2005), Chattapadhyay, 
Chaudhuri and Schneider (2006), Dell'Anno and Schneider (2003), Mummert and Schneider 
(2002) and Schneider and Enste (2000) use the MIMIC approach, another version of the 
DYMIMIC approach. The DYMIMIC approach has its origin in the more basic MIMIC 
approach. 
personal   3265 35.53 17.91 0 150 
law and order   3488 3.71 1.46 0 6 
regulation   2009 6.40 1.23 1 9.4 
tariff   1703 8.04 10.38 0 254.58 
tariff unweighted   1703 9.28 8.42 0 105.36 
gdp 7988 6615.54 10671.26 54.50 108111.2 
labor   3843 67.83 10.30 39.6 91.3 
G   7166 15.94 6.88 1.37 76.22 
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Figure 1. Shadow economy as % GDP over various regions 
 
Figure 2 shows the value of the shadow economy per GDP over time for all 
the countries in my database. The trend of the shadow economy looks 
increasing, but the variable increases and decreases over time probably as 
shadow economies follow the business cycles of formal economies.  
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Figure 2. Shadow economy as % GDP over time 
 
I use in the analysis the variable called shadow, which is the logarithm of 
the shadow economy per capita expressed in constant US dollars. I do not 
use the shadow economy expressed as a percentage of GDP in the 
regression analysis because economic sanctions are likely to affect both the 
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shadow economy and the official GDP and thus, the percentage of shadow 
economy of the GDP would not be a good dependent variable for this type of 
regression analysis. The logarithm also allows me to interpret the results as 
percentages. I also use another variable which I call shadow1 in some 
robustness checks to the regression analysis. This new variable shadow1 is 
estimated using the data on shadow economy per GDP from the various 
studies where these data exist and replacing the missing variables with the 
mean shadow economy per GDP. Then, all these values are transformed to 
sizes of shadow economy per capita expressed in constant US dollars. The 
variable shadow1 is the natural logarithm of this new shadow per capita 
measure. This variable has a larger number of observations than shadow. 
The mean of shadow is 11.08% and the mean of shadow1 is 11.10%.  
 
Sanctions data 
 
Economic sanctions are usually defined in the literature as "deliberate, 
government withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or 
financial relations" (Hufbauer et al., 2007). Such sanctions are usually 
imposed to change a policy of one country of which the sender country does 
not approve. Alternatively, the sender can simply do nothing, engage in 
diplomatic discussions with the target country, or initiate a war. Sanctions 
are imposed for a wide range of reasons from preventing human rights 
violations to stopping nuclear weapons from being developed. The senders 
in this dataset are mostly large countries or coalitions of countries such as 
the League of Nations and the European Union. The targets vary from very 
large countries such as India and Pakistan to small ones such as Greece and 
Liberia. Sanctions can involve cuts in imports from the target to the sender 
(called also import sanctions), cuts in exports from the sender to the target 
(called export sanctions), and cuts in financial or development aid and/or 
freezing financial assets (called financial sanctions). These types of 
economic sanctions are usually imposed in a combination of two or three, 
almost never alone. There is still debate in the literature on why economic 
sanctions are lifted. Usually, this happens when the goals of the economic 
sanctions have been met or when the sender country changed its mind or 
reevaluated the policy goals of the economic sanctions. 
 
The sanction variables used in this paper are constructed using the 
sanctions presented in the well-known Hufbauer et al. (2007) dataset. This 
dataset provides information on economic sanctions imposed on various 
countries around the world between the years of 1914 and 2007. I updated 
this dataset using the information on economic sanctions posted on the 
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Peterson Institute website5, after the Hufbauer et al. (2007) book was 
published. While I have information on economic sanctions starting from 
1914 up to 2012, I only use sanctions ranging from 1960 to 2012, since the 
rest of the data on macroeconomic variables is available only for years after 
1960. The unit of observation in this analysis is one country-year. The 
sanction variable in this study equals one, if country i was sanctioned in 
year t by another country or alliance of countries, and zero, if country i was 
not sanctioned at all. 
 
The other six sanction variables used in this paper are cooperation, gnp 
ratio, financial, comprehensive, high cooperation, and high gnp ratio. These 
six variables are also based on the indicators developed by Hufbauer et al. 
(2007). Cooperation measures the degree of international support for the 
economic sanction. It takes value one if there is no cooperation, two if there 
is minor cooperation, three if there is modest cooperation and four if there 
is significant cooperation for the economic sanction. No cooperation 
includes incidents when the sender country took action against a target 
country and sought no cooperation or sought it, but did not get it. Such 
examples include the economic sanction imposed by the United States 
against Brazil in 1962 when the United States sought to destabilize 
President Goulart. Significant cooperation means that important 
commercial partners made an important and coordinated effort to limit 
trade and/or finance with the target. Examples include the sanction 
imposed by the United Nations against Iraq and Serbia. Also, for the 
purpose of this paper, if a target country was sanctioned in more than one 
sanction incident in one year, the cooperation variable is defined as the 
mean cooperation scores for each sanction incident in that particular year. 
Gnp ratio is defined as the ratio of sender's GNP to the target's GNP. In my 
database, it ranges between .04 and 50,869, if economic sanctions are 
imposed. The average is 1130.10 as many large countries are senders and 
many small countries are targets. In addition, gnp ratio is defined as the 
average of the gnp ratio for all sanction incidents, if the target country was 
sanctioned in multiple sanction incidents in one year. Financial is a dummy 
variable that takes value one if a country was sanctioned by either freezing 
assets, cutting development aid, loans or reducing access to banks and zero, 
if there are no sanctions imposed or other sanctions than financial are 
imposed. Comprehensive sanctions are sanctions that involve all types of 
economic sanctions (financial, export and import) at the same time. 
Comprehensive takes value one if all three types of sanctions are imposed 
and zero, if no sanctions are imposed, or only one type of sanction is 
imposed (financial, import or export) or if only two types of sanctions are 
imposed. High cooperation is another dummy variable that takes value one 
                                                             
5 http://www.piie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=1821. 
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if the value of cooperation is between three and four (above the median 
value for cooperation for the countries that are sanctioned in my sample) 
and zero if cooperation is below three, or there are no sanctions at all. 
Finally, high gnp ratio is a dummy variable that takes value one if the 
country was sanctioned by a sender country with a GNP higher or equal to 
31 times the GNP of the target country (higher than the median value for 
the GNP ratio in the sample of countries that were sanctioned) and zero if 
there are no sanctions at all or there are sanctions with GNP ratio is lower 
than 31. 
 
Other data 
 
Other dependent variables include robbery rates, kidnapping rates, drug 
crime rates, sexual assault rates, and three indicators of the level of 
corruption from the Global Competitiveness Report. The four crime rates 
are expressed as the number of incidents per 100,000 inhabitants. The 
three corruption variables are corruption tax (how common are bribes 
associated with tax payments?), corruption contract (how common are 
bribes in public contracts?), and corruption trade (how common are bribes 
in import and export transactions?). These original values from the Global 
Competitiveness Report were rescaled to vary from one to ten, where one 
means bribes are rare and ten that they are common. For the sample used in 
this paper, corruption tax averages 3.6 out of 10, corruption contract 4.82 
out of 10, and corruption trade 3.88 out of 10. 
 
Urban rates, GDP per capita, highest personal income tax rate, highest 
corporate income tax rate, law and order, regulation, tariff, unweighted 
tariff, labor participation rates and government expenditures per GDP are 
other controls in the analysis. The tariff rate is the weighted mean of tariffs 
on all products in one country, while the unweighted tariff is the simple 
mean of all tariffs in one country. The average tariff is 8.04% and the 
average for the unweighted tariff is 9.28%. The GDP per capita variable is 
expressed in constant US dollars. The variable ranges between $54.50 and 
$108,111.2. The mean is $6,615. The government expenditures, G is the 
general government final consumption expenditure as a percent of GDP. 
This variable varies between 1.37% and 76.22%. 
 
 
Econometric model 
 
This study estimates the impact of sanctions on the shadow economy. In the 
first econometric estimation of the paper, the logarithm of the shadow 
economy per capita is the dependent variable and the sanction dummy is an 
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independent variable. I also control for other country characteristics X and 
include country and year fixed effects. Equation (1) summarizes this 
approach: 
 
shadowit=α₀+α₁sanctionit+α₂Xit+δi+τt+εit,(1) 
 
where i is country i, t is year t, δi is the country fixed effect, τt is the time 
fixed effect and Xit are country characteristics such as urban, corporate rate, 
personal rate, law and order, tariff, and regulation. 
 
According to the arguments presented in the previous sections, economic 
sanctions could both stimulate and inhibit the activities in the shadow 
economy. High rates of the urban population are likely to decrease the 
shadow economy as the informal activity is more often encountered in rural 
areas. An increase in any of the three tax rates (highest personal income tax 
rate, highest corporate tax rate and weighted mean tariff rate) is likely to 
increase the shadow economy as individuals and companies are less likely 
to work and operate in the formal economy when the tax burden in their 
country is very high. Better law and order in a country make breaking the 
law and operating underground more difficult and thus, it decreases the 
shadow economy. Burdensome regulations translate into higher costs of 
doing business in the formal sector that leads firms to move to the informal 
sector, increasing in this way the size of the shadow economy. Tradition, 
culture, and history could influence people's tolerance toward informal 
activities and thus determine the size of the shadow economy. These 
country-specific characteristics are considered not vary over the time 
period covered and thus, are controlled through the country fixed effects. 
(1) includes year fixed effects because the sample analyzed covers a long 
period of time during which worldwide shocks that are not controlled by 
the other variables could have affected all countries' shadow activity. 
 
The second specification is similar to (1), but I also control for specific types 
of sanction. The new estimation is: 
 
shadowit=β₀+β₁sanctionit+β₂sanctionit*type sanctionit+β₃Xit+δi+τt+εit,(2)  
 
where type sanctionit can be the different sanctions characteristics such as 
the international cooperation (cooperation), the GNP ratio between the 
sender and the target (gnp ratio), financial sanction (financial), and import, 
export and financial sanction (comprehensive). 
 
If economic sanctions have a large negative impact on the formal economy, 
then it is likely they will move more people in the informal economy, thus 
leading to an increase in the shadow economy. Thus, I expect sanctions 
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imposed by large senders relative to the targets (senders with large GNP 
relative to the GNP of the target), sanctions with strong international 
support and comprehensive sanctions which can hurt the official economy 
of the target the most, to also increase the informal economy of the target. 
From the arguments presented in the previous sections, I expect the 
financial and trade sanctions have ambiguous effects on the shadow 
economy.  
 
In addition to (1) and (2), I also estimate the effects of sanctions on other 
activities associated with an informal activity such as corruption and crime. 
I expect that sanctions will increase corruption as more bribes need to be 
paid to hide the informal activity and will increase some crime rates like 
robbery rates as informal activity also involves some illegal activity, but not 
affect crime rates such as kidnapping, drug crimes, burglary or sexual 
assault rates as they are not related to informal activities caused by 
sanctions. 
 
 
Results 
 
Table 2 presents the results of specifications (1) and (2). The specifications 
are OLS with fixed effects for countries and years. The standard errors are 
clustered at the country level. Table 2 presents the effects of sanctions and 
the additional effects of cooperation, gnp ratio, financial and 
comprehensive. The dependent variable in Table 2 is the variable shadow, 
the logarithm of shadow economy per capita expressed in constant US 
dollars. All specifications control for the following variables: urban 
population, corporate tax rate, personal income tax rate, law and order, 
regulations, and weighted tariff rate. Column (1) shows that sanctions 
increase the shadow economy by 9% with all the other variables kept 
constant. The coefficient is significant at 10% level. 
 
In column (2), I interact for the international cooperation variable and I find 
that sanctions increase the size of the shadow economy if the international 
cooperation variable is larger or equal to two (the sanctions have minor to 
significant international cooperation). If the international cooperation is 
less than two (sanctions have no international cooperation), then the effect 
of sanctions on the shadow economy is negative. This result confirms that 
economic sanctions that cause harm to the official economy can encourage 
the activity in the informal economy. Sanctions with no international 
support might decrease the shadow economy because these types of weak 
sanctions might make the pre-existent shadow markets more vulnerable to 
shocks and weaken them. 
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In column (3), I interact the sanction variable with the gnp ratio variable to 
investigate whether sanctions imposed by larger senders than the target 
have a larger effect on the informal economy. The effects of economic 
sanctions on the size of the shadow economy remain positive and 
statistically significant at 10% and the magnitude is higher than that in the 
first specification, but the interaction term is not statistically different from 
zero. One explanation for this result can be that larger senders might not 
have additional effects on the size of the shadow economy because just 
being big does not necessarily translate into greater ability to harm the 
target's formal economy and to encourage its informal economy. 
 
Next, I analyze if trade and financial sanctions have different effects on the 
shadow economy. I control for the sanctions dummy and for the interaction 
term between sanctions and the financial sanctions dummy, leaving the 
interaction between sanctions and trade sanctions as the omitted category. 
The effects of sanctions remain positive and significant, but the type of 
sanctions does not have an additional effect. According to the framework 
described in the previous sections, financial and trade sanctions have both a 
positive and a negative effect on the informal market and the two effects 
may cancel each other out.  
 
In the last column, I interact for the comprehensive sanction dummy to see 
if comprehensive sanctions have an additional effect on the shadow 
economy. While sanctions still have a positive and statistically significant 
effect on the size of the shadow economy, the comprehensive sanctions do 
not affect the shadow economy more than economic sanctions in general. 
Again, it is possible that this dummy for comprehensive sanctions does not 
capture correctly the ability of a sanction to hurt the formal economy of the 
target and implicitly, to encourage the informal economy in the target. 
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Table 2. Main effects of sanctions on the shadow economy 
 (1) 
shadow 
(2) 
shadow 
(3) 
shadow 
(4) 
shadow 
(5) 
shadow 
sanction  0.09 
(0.05)* 
-0.21 
(0.12)* 
0.12 
(0.07)* 
0.16 
(0.09)* 
0.13 
(0.06)** 
sanction* 
cooperation  
 0.12 
(0.05)** 
   
sanction* 
gnp ratio  
  -0.0001 
(0.0003) 
  
sanction* 
financial  
   -0.08 
(0.12) 
 
sanction* 
comprehensive  
    -0.11 
(0.17) 
urban  -0.005 
(0.009) 
-0.008 
(0.007) 
-0.006 
(0.008) 
-0.005 
(0.009) 
-0.006 
(0.008) 
corporate  -0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.006 
(0.002)** 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.005 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
personal  -0.0001 
(0.002) 
0.0009 
(0.002) 
-0.0001 
(0.002) 
-0.00003 
(0.002) 
0.0001 
(0.002) 
law and order  0.02 
(0.01)* 
0.02 
(0.01)* 
0.02 
(0.01)* 
0.02 
(0.01)* 
0.02 
(0.01)* 
regulation  0.01 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
tariff  -0.001 
(0.0009) 
-0.0002 
(0.0008) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.0009) 
-0.001 
(0.0009)* 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.9959 0.9961 0.9959 0.9959 0.9960 
Observations 322 320 320 320 320 
* denotes significant at 10% level, ** denotes significant at 5% level 
 and *** denotes significant at 1% level. 
 
Table 3 presents a number of robustness checks for the main specification 
in Table 2. In the first four columns, I change the way the sanction variables 
are defined. In the first column, I control for the high cooperation dummy 
(high cooperation). Such a sanction increases the size of the shadow 
economy by 23%, keeping for all the rest of the variables constant. This is 
consistent with previous results that sanctions with strong international 
support have stronger positive effects on the shadow economy than 
sanctions imposed without the support of other countries.  
 
In column (2), I control for the high gnp ratio dummy and find that 
economic sanctions imposed by senders at least 31 times larger than the 
target country have a positive and significant effect on the size of the 
shadow economy. In Table 2, the GNP ratio did not have an additional effect 
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on the shadow economy when used it as an interaction term. It is possible 
we find significant results in this specification because of omitted variable 
bias due to the absence of the sanction dummy. However, these results are 
not inconsistent with the theory according to which sanctions that have a 
larger economic impact on the formal economy of the target, also affect the 
informal economy of the target more strongly. 
 
The next two columns we see that financial sanctions and comprehensive 
sanctions have positive but insignificant effects, which is consistent with the 
previous results.  
 
In column (5), I control for three channels through which sanctions can 
affect the shadow market and find that the coefficient of the sanction 
variable drops from 9%, in the initial specification, to 8% here, which 
confirms these are some of the channels through which sanctions affect the 
informal market. 
 
In the next column, I change the dependent variable from shadow to 
shadow 1, the logarithm of shadow economy per capita estimated using the 
data from different sources and the mean shadow economy values for all 
the missing observations. This specification has a larger number of 
observations since I have less missing observations for the independent 
variable, but the effects of economic sanctions remain identical to the ones 
in the main specification (Table 2 Column (1)) using the variable shadow as 
an independent variable.  
 
In the last column, I use the unweighted tariff rate as a control instead of the 
usual tariff variable which is a weighted mean of all the tariff rates in one 
country. The effects of the sanctions remain positive and statistically 
significant as they were in the specification using the weighted tariff 
measure. 
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Table 3. Robustness checks 
 (1) 
shadow 
(2) 
shadow 
(3) 
Shadow 
(4) 
shadow 
(5) 
shadow 
(6) 
shadow1 
(7) 
shadow 
high 
coopera-
tion 
 
0.23 
(0.07)*** 
   
   
high gnp 
ratio  
 0.15 
(0.08)* 
     
financial    0.09 
(0.07) 
    
Compre- 
hensive  
   0.03 
(0.14) 
   
sanction      0.08 
(0.04)** 
0.09 
(0.05)* 
0.08 
(0.05)* 
gdp     0.00001 
(0.0000
1) 
  
labor      -0.005 
(0.006) 
  
G      -0.01 
(0.007) 
  
urban  -0.009 
(0.007) 
-0.006 
(0.008) 
-0.005 
(0.009) 
-0.004 
(0.01) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
-0.007 
(0.009) 
-0.005 
(0.009) 
corporate  -0.006 
(0.002)** 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-
0.00440
2 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
personal  0.0005 
(0.002) 
-0.0004 
(0.002) 
-0.0005 
(0.002) 
-0.0008 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-
0.0003 
(0.002) 
-0.0001 
(0.002) 
law and 
order  
0.03 
(0.01)** 
0.02 
(0.01)* 
0.02 
(0.01)* 
0.02 
(0.01)* 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.01)* 
0.02 
(0.01)* 
regula-
tion  
0.03 
(0.02) 
0.008 
(0.02) 
0.009 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
tariff  0.000006 
(0.0007) 
-0.002 
(0.001)* 
-0.001 
(0.0009) 
-0.0005 
(0.0009) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
 
tariff un-
weighted 
      -0.0009 
(0.0008) 
Country 
FE 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.9960 0.9959 0.9958 0.9957 0.9961 0.9956 0.9959 
Observa-
tions 
317 320 320 320 
317 323 322 
 
For further robustness checks, I look at the effects of economic sanctions on 
variables that might be affected positively by an increase in the informal 
* denotes significant at 10% level, ** denotes significant at 5% level  
and *** denotes significant at 1% level 
 
642 | Ioana M. PETRESCU 
The Effects of Economic Sanctions on the Informal Economy 
activity. In the first three columns of Table 4, I look at the effects of 
sanctions on various measures of corruption. Economic sanctions increase 
corruption in multiple areas. The magnitude of the effects varies by the type 
of corruption (tax, contract, or trade related). The largest effects of 
sanctions are for corruption associated with public contracts. Sanctions 
increase the score of corruption contract by 1.58. The smallest effect is for 
corruption associated with tax payments. Sanctions increase this score by 
.84. This is consistent with the theory according to which sanctions increase 
the incidence of corruption because more bribes are being paid to officials 
to close their eyes at the growing informal activity occurring in the target.  
 
In column (4), I estimate the effects of sanctions on the robbery rates. I find 
that economic sanctions increase the variable robbery rate by 32 per 
100,000 inhabitants keeping for all the other variables constant. This is 
consistent with the theory presented above according to which certain 
types of crimes such as robberies are likely to increase when other illegal 
activities occur in sanctioned countries. 
 
Table 4. Effects of sanctions on other aspects of informal activity 
 (1) 
corruption 
tax 
(2) 
corruption 
contract 
(3) 
corruption 
trade 
(4) 
robbery 
 
sanction 0.84 
(0.32)*** 
1.58 
(0.44)*** 
1.35 
(0.34)*** 
32.47 
(13.67)** 
urban 0.07 
(0.10) 
0.18 
(0.14) 
0.14 
(0.11) 
5.16 
(10.05) 
corporate 0.01 
(0.009)* 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.009) 
0.006 
(0.41) 
personal 0.0006 
(0.01) 
-0.002 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.41 
(0.47) 
law and 
order 
-0.01 
(0.06) 
-0.09 
(0.07) 
-0.02 
(0.07) 
-0.45 
(8.38) 
regulation 0.09 
(0.15) 
0.23 
(0.17) 
0.07 
(0.16) 
-2.64 
(8.38) 
tariff 0.02 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.01) 
-1.03 
(1.59) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.9499 0.9446 0.9554 0.9755 
Observations 308 308 308 326 
* denotes significant at 10% level, ** denotes significant at 5% level  
and *** denotes significant at 1% level. 
 
Table 5 shows several placebo tests. First, I estimate at the effects of 
economic sanctions on crime rates that should not be correlated with an 
informal market activity that is created by the economic sanctions. The 
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impact of economic sanctions on kidnapping, drug activity, burglary and 
sexual assaults should be zero. There is no reason to believe that more 
people are being kidnapped, houses are burglarized more often or that 
more women are being raped if sanctions are imposed. Drug production 
depends on the type of drugs that can be grown in that country and 
trafficking depends on the existent networks and thus, these drug-related 
activities do not emerge only because sanctions are imposed. The results in 
this table confirm these theories and show that economic sanctions do not 
have a statistically significant effect on these types of criminal activities.  
 
Table 5. Placebo tests 
 (1) 
kidnapping 
 
(2) 
drugs 
 
(3) 
burglary 
 
(4) 
sexual 
sanction  -0.36 
(0.62) 
22.27 
(146.83) 
-68.34 
(50.7) 
-0.13 
2.66 
urban  0.0004 
(0.23) 
-9.03 
(7.42) 
62.81 
(21.62)*** 
-0.06 
(2.13) 
corporate  0.02 
(0.01)* 
1.20 
(1.24) 
-0.71 
(3.71) 
0.07 
(0.09) 
personal  0.02 
(0.02) 
0.72 
(0.92) 
-1.35 
(1.81) 
0.27 
(0.26) 
law and 
order 
-0.28 
(0.48) 
2.01 
(9.81) 
56.78 
(52.60) 
1.07 
(1.72) 
regulation  -0.41 
(0.30) 
-2.29 
(17.06) 
37.64 
(25.73) 
-5.05 
(2.32)** 
tariff  0.02 
(0.04) 
-3.08 
(2.94) 
-1.35 
(5.09) 
-0.28 
(0.47) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.9280 0.9801 0.9733 0.9511 
Observations 267 252 280 234 
* denotes significant at 10% level, ** denotes significant at 5% level 
 and *** denotes significant at 1% level. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper compiles data on the size of shadow economy as percentage of 
GDP for 147 countries spanning 46 years from different studies and updates 
the data from the well-known Hufbauer et al. (2007) with newer economic 
sanction data from the Peterson Institute for International Economics 
website. It uses these data to estimate the effects of economic sanctions on 
the shadow economy per capita, corruption, robbery, kidnapping, drug 
crime, burglary, and sexual assault rates. It finds that economic sanctions 
increase the size of the shadow economy per capita by approximately 9%. 
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The effects are larger for sanctions with strong international support. The 
GNP ratio between target and sender or the type of sanction (import, 
export, or financial) do not alter the magnitude of the effect. Sanctions 
increase robbery rates by 32.47 per 100,000 inhabitants, but it does not 
affect kidnapping, drug crime, burglary and sexual assault rates. Sanctions 
also increase corruption related to tax collection, public contracts, and 
trade. 
 
There are two main implications of these results. First, given that criminals 
do not reform easily, we can conclude that people starting criminal 
activities during the sanctioned period are not likely to take a job in the 
official labor market after the economic sanctions end. In addition, workers 
from the informal sector in non-criminal activities have difficulty to move to 
the formal sector (Nelson & De Bruijn, 2005), informality in the labor sector 
persists over time and it is a substitute for formal labor in many sectors 
(Williams & Round, 2008). Thus, it is conceivable that informal workers 
might not move into the formal labor markets after the sanctions are lifted. 
Informal workers also do not invest in their own education and in the 
education of their children, thus increasing the likelihood that they will find 
jobs only on the black labor market (Oviedo, 2009). According to Enste 
(2003), informality can lead to more acceptance of illegal work and thus, to 
a continuation of these black market activities. Thus, it is likely that the 
black market workers and their children are more likely to stay in the black 
labor markets even after the end of the sanctions. Finally, corruption 
exhibits a high degree of persistence (Damania, Fredriksson & Mani, 2004; 
Hauk & Saez-Marti 2002; Mishra 2006). Since sanctions increase corruption 
in target countries, we can expect that corruption will continue to be a 
problem in these countries long after the sanctions are lifted. Overall, it 
seems that sanctions could have long run effects on the targets' informal 
economies. 
 
Second, since sanctions lead to more informal activity and people can obtain 
sanctioned goods from black markets and through smuggling, can conduct 
financial transactions through informal financial intermediaries, and can 
produce sanctioned goods underground, sanctions could have a smaller 
impact on the population than previously thought. Thus, policymakers 
should consider the emergence of these informal markets when designing 
optimal sanctions that are supposed to put enough pressure on the target 
population and the government to change the desired policies. 
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